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INTRODUCTION 
In late June of 2018, The Boston Globe ran a front-page story with 
the headline “$432,000 Salaries Outrage Officials.”1  The story began, “In 
cash-strapped Methuen, where the average resident earns just under $32,000 
a year, five police captains stand to each make a whopping $432,295 a year 
                                               
 * Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Paul Vasiloff for being 
an excellent research assistance, to participants in the Labor Law Symposium at Belmont 
University College of Law, and to their staff for helpful comments of earlier drafts. 
 1. Michael Levenson, $432,000 Salaries Outrage Officials, BOS. GLOBE, June 25, 
2018, at A-1. 
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under their new contract, according to an analysis by the city auditor that has 
outraged residents and officials.”2 
Methuen is not, by any measure, an affluent city by Massachusetts 
standards.3  Yet, the Globe story describes expected payouts to the city’s 
highest paid police officers that would exceed the salaries paid to the 
governor,4 the Boston Police Commissioner,5 and the Superintendent of the 
state police.6  To further complicate matters, the Globe reported that Methuen 
recently “laid off [fifty-two] public school teachers, nine school 
administrators, and additional support staff as a result of a $6.5 million 
shortfall in the budget.”7 
Loyal readers rightly wondered how this could possibly have 
occurred—i.e., how could a small, struggling city agree to these 
extraordinary salaries for a handful of public safety officers as they were 
laying off teachers and contemplating a loan from the state in order to 
forestall municipal bankruptcy?  Well, it turns out the mayor—one James 
Jajuga—has a police captain son who stands to benefit directly from the 
newly signed contract between the police union and the city.8  Mr. Jajuga 
voted for the new contract while he was a city council member in 2017.9  
Jajuga now says he was assured by the previous mayor that the contract 
simply provided for 2% raises. While the former mayor “could not be reached 
for comment,” he has said “that he blames his negotiating team and the 
auditor . . . for not alerting him to the full financial impact of the contract.”10 
A careful read of the contract (which it appears now-Mayor Jajuga 
never bothered with) does reveal that it provides for 2% increases; it also 
reveals “a complex formula requiring officers’ benefits be calculated as part 
of their base pay, which means they are receiving a 2[%] increase on a much 
                                               
 2. Id. 
 3. Settled in 1642, Methuen is a small city north of Boston that reported a population 
of 47,255 and a median household income of $61,822 in the 2010 census. Methuen Town city, 
Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010) (available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces
/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml). 
 4. Levenson, supra note 1 (stating that Republican Charlie Baker earns $151,800 
annually). 
 5. Id. (stating that William B. Evans earns a salary of $238,846). Evans is chief of the 
state’s largest city with a population of 685,094. Boston city, Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (July 1, 2017) (available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/commu
nity_facts.xhtml); See also Stephen Beale, Boston’s Highest Paid City Employees Earn 
Approximately $300,000, NEW BOS. POST (Oct. 18, 2016, 9:32 AM), 
http://newbostonpost.com/2016/10/18/bostons-highest-paid-city-employees-earn-300000/. 
 6. Levenson, supra note 1 (stating that Richard McKeon was earning $386,829 when 
he stepped down in 2018). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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higher salary.”11  This generous definition of base pay is then further 
amplified by a new requirement that 
each rank . . . must earn a certain percentage more than the 
one below it. So[,] the sergeants’ base pay is increased to 
include their benefits, which is then used to calculate the 
base pay of the lieutenants, who then in turn would have 
their benefits added in when calculating the pay for 
captains.12 
This is apparently common enough to be known as a “stacking 
effect,”13 and it explains the enormous salaries of the highest ranking and 
longest serving members of the force.  It is worth noting that the city council 
approved this contract on a nine to zero vote (three members of the council 
have family members who work for the police department and two others 
were planning to take jobs in the department).14  To top it all off, Captain 
Gallant, president of the Methuen Police Superior Officers Association, 
noted that the contract “is quite clear in its language” and that the dispute 
could end in litigation.15 
This story stands out for its shockingly large numbers and the crude, 
post-revelation efforts by irresponsible elected officials to distance 
themselves from their own decision making.  However, the basic scenario is 
playing out in many small and large cities throughout the country—many of 
them struggling financially.16  How these states and municipalities ended up 
                                               
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. For a more in-depth discussion of the “stacking effect,” see Chris Edwards, Public 
Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of Employee Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87 (2010). 
 14. Levenson, supra note 1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Chicago’s Financial Crisis by the Numbers, CHI. SUN-TIMES (June 24, 
2016, 11:10 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/chicagos-financial-crisis-by-the-
numbers/ (“Because of the city’s weak finances, driven by its massive pension debt, rating 
agencies over the last few years repeatedly have downgraded Chicago’s bond rating. This 
drives up borrowing costs. Only Detroit has a worse rating. Moody’s Investors Service rates 
Chicago two levels above junk status.”); Erin Cox, Md Officials Warn State Debt Threatens 
Construction Projects, BALT. SUN (Dec. 11, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/politics/bs-md-debt-threatens-projects-20151211-story.html (“Construction 
projects that would have been paid for in cash were instead financed with debt, the freed-up 
revenue used to support the ongoing expenses of running the state government.”); Monica 
Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 18, 2013) (“Instead, numerous factors over many years have brought Detroit to 
this point, including a shrunken tax base but still a huge, 139-square-mile city to maintain; 
overwhelming health care and pension costs; repeated efforts to manage mounting debts with 
still more borrowing; annual deficits in the city’s operating budget since 2008; and city 
services crippled by aged computer systems, poor record-keeping and widespread 
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in these straits, and what can and should be done to begin to ameliorate 
“stacking effect”-like contracts that result from a distorted relationship 
between public employers (Methuen) and their public sector unions is the 
subject of this paper. 
Many scholars and others have, for some time now, been calling 
attention to the alarming growth in post-employment and other benefits for 
unionized employees in the public sector.17  A fairly well-understood 
                                               
dysfunction.”); Judy Lin, The Cost of California’s Public Pensions is Rising Fast. But Efforts 
to Fix the Problem by Ballot Measure Have Fizzled, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-pension-crisis-initiatives/ (“Pension reform advocates 
say that achieving real relief in the near term will require reductions in benefits already granted 
to current employees.”); Karisma Maheshwari, Philadelphia Ranks 73rd Out of 75 Major U.S. 
Cities in Financial Health, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Mar. 22, 2018, 9:38 PM), 
http://www.thedp.com/article/2018/03/philadelphia-debt-report-upenn-penn-financial-health 
(“Truth in Accounting attributes much of Philadelphia’s poor financial health to long-term 
debt and financial obligations in pension and retiree health care benefits.”); Katharine Shilcutt, 
Houston is in Bad Financial Shape, Says Fiscal Times, HOUSTANIA (Jan. 11, 2017, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.houstoniamag.com/articles/2017/1/11/houston-is-in-bad-financial-shape-says-
fiscal-times (“We don’t normally put much stock in rankings or ratings, . . . [b]ut it’s hard to 
argue against Houston’s outstanding pension obligations.”); David Smiley, Miami Taxpayers 
Carry Outsized Debt Burden, Report Says, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 11, 2017, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article125721849.html 
(“Repeated decisions by Miami city officials to kick long-term pension and healthcare 
obligations down the road to be paid by future generations of taxpayers have left city residents 
with an outsized debt burden, according to a new report by a financial watchdog agency.”); 
Romy Varghese, Even San Francisco, Flush with Wealth, Has Pension Problems, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-
20/even-san-francisco-flush-with-tech-wealth-has-pension-problems (“The technology 
industry has transformed San Francisco with a boom other cities can only envy. But it hasn’t 
eradicated a problem well known to industrial-era towns: the rising cost of pensions.”); Mary 
Williams Walsh & Karl Russell, New York City Pensions Are Still in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/20/business/dealbook/new-york-
city-pensions.html (“The Manhattan Institute, a research center focusing on urban affairs and 
domestic policy, prefers market values, which put the [unfunded pension] shortfall at about 
$142 billion, more than twice the city’s shortfall estimate.”). 
 17. See, e.g., THOMAS J. FITZPATRICK & AMY B. MONAHAN, FED. RES. BANK 
CLEVELAND, WHO’S AFRAID OF GOOD GOVERNANCE? STATE FISCAL CRISES, PUBLIC PENSION 
UNDERFUNDING, AND THE RESISTANCE TO GOVERNANCE REFORM 1 (2012) (“If neither plan 
participants nor state taxpayers are able to effectively monitor and challenge a state’s 
inadequate funding or improper investment decisions, public plans are very likely to remain 
underfunded.”); JOSHUA D. RAUH, HOOVER INST., HIDDEN DEBT, HIDDEN DEFICITS: 2017 
EDITION 2 (2017) (“What is in fact going on is that the governments are borrowing from 
workers and promising to repay that debt when they retire, but the accounting standards allow 
the bulk of this debt to go unreported through the assumption of high rates of return.”); Jack 
M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2013) (“While most 
public employers and employees in the United States set aside money each year to fund future 
projected pension obligations, many public pension plans are seriously underfunded either 
intentionally or due to unrealistic assumptions concerning investment performance and the 
amount that will be owed over time. This means that unless contributions are increased 
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phenomenon is thought to explain the inability of state and local governments 
to resist outsized demands from their public unions.  As I18 and others19 have 
argued, the central problem with public sector unions is that they find it easy 
to capture their employers (taxpayers) in ways that private sector unions 
cannot.  The role played by often eager and feckless elected officials in this 
process has also been well documented.20 
                                               
substantially, future pension payments to retired government workers will be made, at least in 
part, from current revenues. The problem is thought to be so serious that some local 
governments may be effectively insolvent.”); Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral 
Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Public Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 453–54 
(2012) (“The astonishing debt figures that GASB 45 finally forced states to report are the 
logical result of years of rent-seeking by legislators and public sector unions. Well organized 
unions push hard for improved benefits. Politicians, who are legally obligated to negotiate 
with these unions on behalf of the taxpayers, understand that strong union support in the form 
of votes and dollars can be secured by increasing compensation to the union’s membership.”); 
Rhiannon Jerch et al., Efficient Local Government Service Provision: The Role of 
Privatization and Public Sector Unions 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 
22,088, 2016) (“Strong union bargaining power in non-right-to-work states appears to increase 
the number of full time employees on pay roll, holding the service area constant. These effects 
are most pronounced for a city’s largest transit agency, which suggests public sector unions 
shift their bargaining pressure toward the dominant transit agencies such as Chicago’s CTA, 
New York’s MTA, or Boston’s MBTA.”); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The 
Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 193, 
193 (2014) [hereinafter Novy-Marx & Rauh, Revenue Demands] (“Without policy changes, 
contributions would have to increase by 2.5 times [to achieve full funding of state and local 
pension systems in the United States over 30 years], reaching 14.1% of the total own-revenue 
generated by state and local governments. This represents a tax increase of $1,385 per 
household per year, about half of which [would go] to pay down legacy liabilities while half 
[would fund] the cost of new promises.”); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public Pension 
Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1245-46 (2011) 
(“We find that the pension promises already made to state workers are worth at least $3.20 
trillion as far as taxpayers are concerned, under the assumption that the state can default on 
these promises to the same extent that it can default on its general obligation debt. This is a 
conservative estimate because most state constitutions suggest that pension promises are 
higher in priority than general obligation debt.”); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The 
Liabilities and Risks of State Sponsored Pension Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (2009) 
[hereinafter Novy-Marx & Rauh, Liabilities and Risks]. 
 18. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Friedrichs and the Move Toward Private Ordering of 
Wages and Benefits in the Public Sector (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 16-34, 2016); Maria Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: 
Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525 (2013) 
[hereinafter Hylton, Central Falls]. 
 19. See Jerch, supra note 17; Chris Edwards, Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs 
of Employee Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87, 87 (2010); Robert G. Valletta, The Impact of 
Unionism on Municipal Expenditures and Revenues, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 430, 430 
(1989). 
 20. Jack M. Beermann, Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, offers this 
analysis of the politician’s role in extreme pension liability: “Unfunded pension promises 
benefit politicians in two ways. First, as in all deficit spending, they allow for current officials 
to provide services without requiring taxpayers to pay for them until much later, when they 
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This paper seeks to turn the focus from a now well-recognized 
problem toward the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees21 and to consider 
changes we might expect to see in the short and medium term.  The Court’s 
conclusion—that its forty-year-old decision in Abood v. Detriot Board of 
Education22 should be overturned on First Amendment grounds—did not 
come as much of a surprise.23  Agency fees, the Court held, are inconsistent 
with the First Amendment in so far as they compel speech in a manner that 
cannot survive “exacting scrutiny.”24  Whether or not Janus and its view of 
                                               
may be out of office. Second, pension promises help politicians shore up support among 
government workers, or at least avoid opposition from government workers, which would be 
substantial if significant reductions in pension benefits were proposed.” Beermann, supra note 
17, at 27. 
 21. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 22. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 23. Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Showdown Could Shrink Unions’ Power, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/politics/supreme-court-
unions.html (“The Supreme Court is back to full strength with Mr. Trump’s appointment of 
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, and most observers believe the new justice will join the court’s other 
conservatives to deliver a decision that will hurt public unions.”); Jessica Levinson, Supreme 
Court Decision on Janus v. AFSCME Likely to Permanently Weaken Public Unions, NBC 
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018, 4:36 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/supreme-court-
decision-janus-v-afscme-likely-permanently-weaken-public-ncna851376 (“Although we 
won’t find out the court’s decision until early summer, the cynical prediction that the court 
will vote five-to-four — with a decision that benefits Republicans and harms Democrats — is 
likely true.”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Poised to Deal a Sharp Blow to Unions For 
Teachers and Public Employees, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017, 11:05 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-unions-20170928-story.html (“Now, the 
court has agreed to hear a new case presenting the same issue. And this time, Justice Neil M. 
Gorsuch can — and most likely will — supply the fifth vote for a conservative ruling.”). 
 24. In determining the proper level of scrutiny for agency fees, the majority in Janus 
sought to strike a balance between “strict scrutiny,” advocated for by the petitioner, and 
rational-basis scrutiny, advocated for by the respondents. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. Under the 
“exacting scrutiny” standard, the agency fee arrangement must “serve a compelling state 
interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms.” Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)). In 
applying this standard to agency fees, the majority first considered whether “labor peace” is a 
sufficiently compelling state interest. Id. By “labor peace,” the Court means the “avoidance of 
the conflict and disruption that . . . would occur if the employees in the unit were represented 
by more than one union.” Id. Although the Court recognizes maintaining labor peace is a 
compelling government interest, it notes that the link between agency fees and maintaining 
labor peace is lacking, as in the private sector agency fees are not permitted, yet employees 
still choose to designate unions as exclusive representatives. Id. at 2465–66. Thus, even in the 
absence of agency fees, there is no “conflict or disruption” that comes about when agency fee 
arrangements do not exist, and the state can therefore maintain labor peace through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. Id. 
 Next, the majority addresses the issue of “free riders,” another state interest that the 
respondents would consider sufficiently compelling. “Free riders” are non-members of the 
union who, in the absence of agency fees, would continue to reap the benefits of collective 
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agency fees is compatible with the Court’s own constitutional jurisprudence 
is not a subject about which an employee-benefits lawyer is qualified or eager 
to offer comment.  The benefits perspective may be useful, though, in 
evaluating the likelihood of reforming some of the worst salary and post-
employment excesses now common in parts of the public sector. 
Janus, as many commentators have noted,25 is at least partly about 
political activity and the financial engagement of public unions in the 
political process.  And, no doubt, some supporters of the result are delighted 
that, with a bit of luck, donations to Democratic candidates from teachers’ 
                                               
bargaining without having to contribute monetarily. Id. at 2466. The majority believes that 
such concerns are insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections. Id. The majority 
reasons that there are many private groups that speak out with the intention of gaining 
government support, the benefits of which will affect non-members; yet we do not think that 
just because a group advocates on behalf of a certain demographic (senior citizens, for 
example), that every member of that demographic should be forced to contribute to the costs 
of such advocacy. Id. Accordingly, the free rider rationale does not constitute a compelling 
state interest, and agency fees will fail exacting scrutiny. Id. at 2465–66. 
 25. See, e.g., Philip Bump, The Supreme Court’s Anti-Union Decision Marks a Clear 
Shift in the Power of Working-Class America, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/27/the-supreme-courts-anti-
union-decision-marks-a-clear-shift-in-the-power-of-working-class-
america/?utm_term=.c5fd56914448 (“But unions and union members have been an important 
part of turning out voters on Election Day and a key force pushing for economic policies 
benefiting working-class Americans. There are a lot of asterisks that float around those 
sentences, certainly, but it’s broadly the case that much of the institutional power of blue-
collar America resided in the labor movement.”); Editorial, Unions and Democrats: The Janus 
Decision Rocks Illinois Politics, CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2018, 9:15 AM), http://www.chicagotri
bune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-janus-court-raunerpritzker-20180627-story.html 
(noting the likely reduction in political contributions from labor leaders to the democratic 
party); Ian Millhiser, Springtime for Union Busting?, NATION (June 28, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/springtime-for-union-busting/ (“Unions provide much of 
the Democratic Party’s political infrastructure, including thousands of volunteers. Though 
agency fees cannot lawfully be spent on political activity, Janus is likely to starve many 
unions for cash and could cause some unions to fail entirely. That places the party of Neil 
Gorsuch in a much stronger position each election year.”); Douglas Schoen, Unions and Dems 
Lost Big in Janus, HILL (Jun. 29, 2018, 5:30 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/394907-
unions-and-dems-lost-big-in-janus (“While public employees already had the ability to opt 
out of funding their union’s political arm, the court ruling will reduce the ability of unions to 
influence national politics and to help give a leg up to Democratic candidates.”) 
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unions26 and the likes of The American Federation of State, Council, and 
Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”)27 may decline going forward. 
This paper notes that there will likely be a decline in dues income, 
which may reduce the frequency and/or size of political donations.28  
Whether that will be a good or bad outcome is hard to predict and highly 
dependent on political perspective.  In Wisconsin, for example, the decline 
in union membership and income has not been as catastrophic as some 
predicted following Governor Scott Walker’s successful push for Act 10.29  
                                               
 26. Teachers’ unions, headed by the National Education Association and the American 
Federation of Teachers, contributed almost $27 million in the 2018 election cycle, 95% of 
which went to members of the Democratic Party. Teachers Unions, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE 
POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2018&ind=L1300 (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2018). Since 1990, teachers’ unions have made $178,019,174 in political 
contributions, 96% of which has gone to members of the Democratic Party. Id. 
 27. The American Federation of State, Council, and Municipal Employees contributed 
over $12 million in the 2018 election cycle, including over $1.7 million in lobbying. American 
Fedn of State, County & Municipal Employees, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.ope
nsecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000061&cycle=2018 (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
The contributions have been overwhelmingly directed at Democratic candidates and 
organizations that support such candidates. Id. 
 28. It is important to be clear about the mechanics of the regime at issue in Janus. Under 
Illinois law, if a majority of employees in a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a union, 
the union becomes the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit. 5 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6 (West, current through P.A. 100-1114, of the 2018 Reg. Sess.). The 
employees are not required to join the union but are required to pay their “fair share” or 
“agency fee” to cover the costs of collective bargaining and other mandated union functions. 
Id. Abood blessed this arrangement on the grounds that it maintained “labor peace” and 
avoided free riding. 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977). These arguments are taken up infra at note 24. 
Mark Janus is employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. Janus, 
138 S. Ct. at 2461. He objects to many of the positions taken by the union that serves as his 
exclusive representative, including its position on the ongoing Illinois state budget crisis. Id. 
Janus did not join the union but he was compelled to pay $535 per year in agency fees. Id. 
Justice Alito, writing for the majority noted that: “[a]s illustrated by the record in this case, 
unions charge non-members, not just for the cost of collective bargaining per se, but also for 
many other supposedly connected activities. Here, the nonmembers were told that they had to 
pay for ‘[l]obbying,’ ‘[s]ocial and recreational activities,’ ‘advertising,’ ‘[m]embership 
meetings and conventions,’ and ‘litigation,’ as well as other unspecified ‘[s]ervices’ that ‘may 
ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local bargaining unit.’ The total 
chargeable amount for nonmembers was 78.06% of full union dues.” Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
 29. In an effort to address mounting state debt, in 2011 Wisconsin Governor Scott 
Walker passed Act 10, which severely limited collective bargaining options for public sector 
unions in the state. Jake Lubenow, Wisconsin Union Membership Plummets In Wake Of 
Worker Freedom Laws, MACIVER INST. (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.maciverinstitute.com/20
17/10/wisconsin-union-membership-plummets-in-wake-of-worker-freedom-laws/. Massive 
protests ensued, mainly spearheaded by affected public sector unions. Id. According to data 
collected by the U.S. Department of Labor, statewide union membership has dropped 38.5% 
from 2011 to 2016, while statewide membership rates fell roughly 4% in the same span. Id. 
The Wisconsin Education Association Council, the state’s largest teachers’ union, saw its 
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However, the focus here is on finances for state and local governments and 
not on political activity.  This paper argues that one of the direct benefits of 
Janus should be an almost immediate reduction in the kinds of conditions 
that give rise to Methuen-type situations.  Specifically, this paper notes that 
a drop in income and/or membership should mean that public sector unions 
will bring less clout to the negotiating table, which should lessen the pressure 
elected officials feel to capitulate to financially irresponsible demands.  In 
addition, public unions will now have to devote energy and resources to 
competing for dues-paying members.  In the same way private sector 
businesses typically compete for customers, public unions will have to make 
the case for membership.  If they cannot, it is hard to see why anyone would 
mourn the demise of an organization that lacks the support of its own 
membership. 
To bolster the claim that the anticipated changes following Janus 
will be good for state and municipal finances and taxpayers, Section I reviews 
the key differences between government-provided services and those 
typically offered in the private sector.  Additionally, this section provides a 
review of the economics and political science literature which supports the 
contention that public unions consistently raise the cost of running the 
government.  Section II contains three miniature case studies which illustrate 
the catastrophic effects that public sector unions have had on incarceration 
rates in California following lobbying by unionized prison guards for a “three 
strikes and you’re out” sentencing regime, public transit obligations in 
Massachusetts, and the budgets of a small city in Rhode Island.30  In Section 
III, this paper addresses the “labor peace” and free riding claims raised by 
AFSCME in Janus and suggests that the former is inconsistent with rates of 
strikes observed in right-to-work (“RTW”) states31 and that the latter 
confuses coerced union support with authentic public goods such as military 
defense. Section IV concludes. 
                                               
membership decline from over 100,000 members in 2010 to roughly 36,000 in 2016. Id. 
Moreover, revenue for Council 24 of Wisconsin’s AFSCME branch dropped from $5 million 
in 2011 to $1.5 million in 2013. Steven Verburg, With dues depleted, Wisconsin’s three 
AFSCME councils merge, WIS. ST. J. (May 1, 2015), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/go
vt-and-politics/with-dues-depleted-wisconsin-s-three-afscme-councils-merge/article_136e2
e6e-c63a-503b-8aa5-ad4586ba9e1d.html. Lobbying efforts also took a hit, as AFSCME spent 
over $1 million on such efforts during the 2011 cycle, while spending only $166,495 in 2016. 
See generally Douglas Belkin & Kris Maher, Wisconsin Unions See Ranks Drop Ahead of 
Recall Vote, WALL STREET J. (May 30, 2012, 7:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10
001424052702304821304577436462413999718. 
 30. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1223 (2008). 
 31. Right-to-work laws prevent unions from requiring employees who choose not to 
join the union to pay agency fees in lieu of the union dues. JEFFREY A. EISENACH, NERA 
ECON. CONSULTING, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE 2 (2015). 
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I. SHARED AND DISTINCT FEATURES OF THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
SECTORS AND THE COST OF GOVERNMENT 
A. Government is a Monopoly Provider of Many Services 
(Education, Prisons, Roads, Fire, Police) 
A common observation about the public sector is that it frequently 
offers services as a monopoly provider: there are no direct competitors to the 
police and fire departments, and drivers’ licenses, automobile license plates, 
and inspections can only be obtained at a location and in a manner proscribed 
by the state.32  Even public school teachers work under conditions that are 
typically quite different from those in private or religious schools.33  More 
than a bit of the public school union fury34 that has been directed at charter 
schools is due to the fact that charters are public (i.e., paid for with tax 
dollars) schools whose most remarkable feature is their lack of union contract 
constraints on teacher working conditions.35  The importance of the 
                                               
 32. See Richard E. Wagner & Warren E. Weber, Competition, Monopoly, and the 
Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18 J. L. & ECON. 661 (1975). 
 33. See Sylvia A. Allegretto & Ilan Tojerow, Teacher staffing and pay differences: 
public and private schools, MONTHLY LAB. REV., BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/teacher-staffing-and-pay-differences.htm. 
 34. In 2017, the National Education Association adopted a broad policy designed to 
limit the growth of charter schools. See Lauren Camera, Teachers Union Adopts New, Anti-
Charter School Policy, U.S. NEWS (July 5, 2017, 12:37 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news
/education-news/articles/2017-07-05/teachers-union-adopts-new-anti-charter-school-policy. 
For example, the policy dictates that charter schools must be authorized by the local school 
board and will be subject to close monitoring. Id. Charter schools must also adhere to the same 
regulations as public schools insofar as public meetings, record laws, and employment and 
labor practices are concerned. Id. 
 35. In defense of the policy discussed in the preceding note, National Education 
Association President Lily Garcia stated, “Handing over students’ education to privately 
managed, unaccountable charters jeopardizes student success, undermines public education 
and harms communities. . . . This policy draws a clear line between charters that serve to 
improve public education and those that do not.” Id. Charter schools have long been criticized 
for prioritizing profits over education. See generally id. Since they are not subject to many 
hiring regulations that public schools are, many commentators believe that charter schools hire 
unqualified teachers at a lower salary. See generally Elizabeth Lyon-Ballay, How Asa 
Hutchinson Undermines Arkansas Teachers (But Campaigns on Raising Teacher Pay), 
MEDIUM (Aug. 16, 2018), https://medium.com/@erlyon/hutchinson-promises-teacher-raises-
178c4e0c1388?sk=05b17f2fdea843a3ab606dc629652b3a. Charter schools have also been 
known not to hesitate to cut funding for arts-related programs and to sacrifice a wide education 
berth for a focus on standardized tests. See generally DAVID L. SILVERNAIL & AMY F. 
JOHNSON, ME. EDUC. POL’Y RES. INST., THE IMPACTS OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS ON 
STUDENTS AND TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS: WHAT DOES THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TELL 
US? (2014) (finding evidence that the presence of public charter schools results in lower per 
pupil expenditures in traditional public schools, but noting that the available data do not paint 
a clear picture of the overall effect charter schools have); James Forman Jr., Do Charter 
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observation about the provision of monopoly services is this: unlike private 
sector actors/employers, who must worry constantly about the behavior and 
strategy of competitors, government employers generally have no such 
concerns.  The lack of competition, of course, when combined with voter 
apathy and distraction, explains why legislators often find it expedient to 
respond to public sector union demands. 
A private employer cannot avoid a serious consideration of the cost 
of, for example, an improved vacation or health care plan.  Should a private 
employer’s cost of total compensation increase in the short term, e.g., over 
the life of a new, three-year contract, then that employer must figure out how 
to pass on that cost to consumers, absorb the cost, or increase demand for her 
product to offset the increase in expenses.36  If it is not possible to pass on 
most or all of the increase to consumers, one would expect the employer to 
vigorously resist demands for additional, costly benefits.  The end result 
should reflect a sincere effort by the employer to control costs. 
In the public sector, a different dynamic governs the same scenario.  
The confluence of voter apathy/distraction and need for the employer/elected 
officials to worry not about cost but reelection distort the response to a 
demand for more generous benefits.  The elected official is not spending her 
money, but the money belonging to taxpayers, who are notoriously over 
reliant on their elected agents.37  Moreover, in return for more generous 
benefits, the union can offer direct help to the elected official—votes and 
                                               
Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging Evidence From Fifteen Years of a Quasi-
Market for Schools, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2007) (finding that the effects of charter schools 
on public education in general are not substantial, but emphasizing the need for further 
research in the field); Valerie Strauss, A Disturbing Look at How Charter Schools Are Hurting 
a Traditional School District, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/09/a-disturbing-look-at-how-charter-schools-are-hurting-a-
traditional-school-district/?utm_term=.e7062d8c0b78 (explaining how local spending on 
charter schools in a Pennsylvania town detracts from programs designed to provide social and 
academic support for struggling students); Diane Ravitch, When Public Goes Private, as 
Trump Wants: What Happens?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/08/when-public-goes-private-as-trump-wants-
what-happens/ (characterizing the charter school movement as part of a larger political and 
economic agenda of privatization). 
 36. See generally Edward Ring, The Ideology of Public Sector Unions vs. Private Sector 
Unions, CAL. POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 20, 2012), https://californiapolicycenter.org/the-ideology-of-
public-sector-unions-vs-private-sector-unions/. 
 37. For a deeper discussion of the principal-agent problem, see Sean Gailmard & Jeffrey 
A. Jenkins, Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate, 53 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 324 (2009); Maria O’Brien Hylton, Friedrichs and the Move Toward Private 
Ordering of Public Employee Wages and Benefits in the Public Sector, 23 CONN. INS. L. J. 177 
(2016); MARK PENNINGTON, CATO INST., PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND THE WELFARE STATE 
(2011); and Fred Smith, The Political Principal/Agent Problem, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2011, 12:39 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/fredsmith/2011/04/28/the-political-principalagent-proble
m/#35ee440c1bb1; Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18. 
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assistance with obtaining votes as well as direct financial contributions to 
cover the expense of costly political campaigns—in exchange for support.38 
Public sector union political contributions, like all political 
contributions, are designed to support and reward the elected 
official/employer in a manner that has no corollary in the private sector.  It is 
facilitated by ever-present problems of agency and moral hazard: the public 
employer is spending other people’s money, and the presence of endless 
distractions and noise make it hard even for attentive taxpayers to pay close 
attention.  Only when taxpayers become disgusted and push back with 
propositions and other initiatives designed to control legislative spending39 
do legislators discover the limits of this approach.  In the meantime, though, 
both the public official and the public union find that they can be very helpful 
to each other. 
B. Evidence About Wages and Salaries Across the Two Sectors in 
Oklahoma and Elsewhere 
In a fascinating paper, W. Robert Reed, a Professor of Economics at 
the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, looks at the effect of RTW 
legislation on wages in Oklahoma.40  He finds that wages are higher in RTW 
                                               
 38. See Veronique De Rugy, Fourteen of America’s 25 Biggest Campaign Donors Are 
Unions, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 5, 2014, 7:17 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/four
teen-americas-25-biggest-campaign-donors-are-unions-veronique-de-rugy/. 
 39. As part of a “tax revolt” going on in the country in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, 
both California and Massachusetts passed ballot measures designed to limit the state’s ability 
to raise property taxes. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C 
(1980). In 1978, voters in California passed the famous Proposition 13, which amended the 
state constitution, limits the tax rate on real estate and subjects any future increase of any state 
tax rate to a two-thirds majority vote in both legislative houses. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a). 
Proposition 13 got national attention and helped inspire a Massachusetts version two years 
later in 1980, Proposition 2.5. Dennis Hale, Proposition 2½ a Decade Later: The Ambiguous 
Legacy of Tax Reform in Massachusetts, 25 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 117, 117 (1993). Like 
Proposition 13, Proposition 2.5 limits the extent to which the state government can increase 
property taxes per year (the “2.5” represents the 2.5% limit on property tax increases), and 
any attempt to exceed this amount must have a majority backing (but not a two-thirds 
legislature vote). See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C. For a discussion on the larger context 
of the tax revolt in America, see Clyde Haberman, The California Ballot Measure that 
Inspired a Tax Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2016),  https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/us
/the-california-ballot-measure-that-inspired-a-tax-revolt.html; and Robert Lindsey, Many 
States Moving to Limit Spending, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/19
78/06/26/archives/many-states-moving-to-limit-spending-coast-vote-spurs-efforts-to.html. 
 40. Nearly forty years after narrowly failing to pass right-to-work legislation in 1964, 
in 2001 Oklahoma became the twenty-second state to enact a right-work-law. W. Robert Reed, 
How Right-To-Work Laws Affect Wages, 24 J. LAB. RES. 713, 713 (2003). The state 
constitutional amendment limits the ability of employers and labor unions from forcing 
employees to join the union or pay money to the union as a condition of employment. OKLA. 
CONST. art. 23, § 1A. 
2019] COMMON-SENSE DEFENSE OF JANUS 53 
 
states, controlling for the initial economic conditions of the state.41  He also 
points to other studies which have concluded that RTW is positively 
correlated with plant location, the rate of business formation, and 
manufacturing employment.42 
Given the recent and quite dramatic organized activity by teachers in 
Oklahoma (and elsewhere)43 to demand wage increases and budget increases 
for public education, it makes no sense to dismiss the possibility that non-
agency fee environments might well lead to improved outcomes for public 
employees, at least under certain conditions.  Due to state law limitations on 
the state’s ability to raise taxes, the Oklahoma legislature had not raised taxes 
since 1990, leading many to believe that public funding for education was 
severely lacking.  Frustrated by low and stagnant wages, teachers in 
Oklahoma gave the state legislature until April 1, 2018, to provide new 
funding.44  When that deadline passed, thousands of teachers and labor 
                                               
 41. Reed, supra note 40, at 713. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Teacher walkouts in Oklahoma were inspired by similarly staged walkouts in West 
Virginia two months earlier, which yielded a $2,000 salary increase for teachers. Jess Bidgood 
& Campbell Robertson, West Virginia Walkouts a Lesson in the Power of a Crowd-Sourced 
Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/us/west-virginia-
teachers-strike.html (“Experts say the West Virginia teachers may foreshadow the future of 
organized labor, especially in the public sector, at a time when its power has been eroded in 
much of the country by anti-union legislation and by court challenges like the Janus case, now 
before the Supreme Court, which threatens the financial viability of collective bargaining.”). 
Indeed, the trend started in West Virginia spread to Arizona (20% pay raise for teachers), 
Kentucky (override of Governor Matt Bevin’s proposed bill, which would have put spending 
on education at a historic low), and Colorado (2% raise for teachers). See Anita Snow & Terry 
Tang, Arizona Teachers End Walkout After Governor Signs Off on 20% Raise, CHI. TRIB. 
(May 3, 2018, 8:44 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-arizona-
teacher-protests-20180503-story.html (“[Governor Doug] Ducey said the teachers had earned 
a raise and praised the legislation as a real win for both teachers and students. The pay 
increases will cost about $300 million for the coming year alone.”) (internal quotes omitted); 
Shannon Van Sant, Kentucky Governor Apologizes for Comments on Teachers’ Strike, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 15, 2018, 7:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/04/15/602671694/kentucky-governor-apologizes-for-comments-on-teachers-strike 
(“More than 30 Kentucky school districts closed Friday for the rallies. Teachers also protested 
Bevin’s plan to overhaul the state pension system, among the worst-funded in the nation. 
Bevin’s pension-reform bill, which he signed on Tuesday, requires new teachers to enter a 
cash-balance plan, and not a traditional pension. Teachers groups say these changes to the 
pension system could discourage people from pursuing a career in education.”); Danika 
Worthington, Pueblo Teachers Launch Colorado’s First Teachers’ Strike in 24 Years, 
DENVER POST (May 7, 2018, 10:48 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/05/07/pueblo-
teacher-strike/ (“The district said a 2 percent increase for teachers would cost roughly $1.2 
million annually. The district had a $3.6 million deficit this year. Additionally, the district 
needs $173 million next year for building renovations and repairs to aging infrastructure.”). 
 44. Dana Goldstein & Elizabeth Dias, Oklahoma Teachers End Walkout After Winning 
Raises and Additional Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/04/12/us/oklahoma-teachers-strike.html. 
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organizers engaged in a nine-day strike that ended when the legislature 
agreed to a $6,000 salary increase for teachers and a $1,250 salary increase 
for support staff.45  Although not the desired outcome for teachers, President 
of the Oklahoma Education Association Alicia Priest called it a “victory for 
teachers.”46 
Additionally, Sarah F. Anzia, an Associate Professor at the 
University of California, Berkley, Goldman School of Public Policy, and 
Terry M. Moe, a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, have 
looked at the effect of public sector unions on the cost of government 
operations and found that unions and the collective bargaining process 
increase the costs of government in “substantially significant” ways.47  While 
the results are mixed,48 there is certainly enough evidence to suggest that the 
model pursued by RTW states is neither irrational nor necessarily 
                                               
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (“To fund the measures, as well as some limited new revenues for schools, the 
Republican-controlled Legislature and Gov. Mary Fallin instituted new or higher taxes on oil 
and gas production, tobacco, motor fuels, and online sales. The state will also allow ball and 
dice gambling, which will be taxed.”); see also Dana Goldstein, Their Pay Has Stood Still. 
Now Oklahoma Teachers Could Be the Next to Walk., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/20/us/oklahoma-teachers-strike.html?action=click&modu
le=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer (“But most instructional costs are 
covered by the state, where laws and politics make it difficult to raise taxes. And it is inside 
the classroom that students and parents have noticed the impact of depressed state budgets.”). 
 47. Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, Public Sector Unions and the Costs of 
Government, 77 J. POL. 114, 124–25 (2015) (“In sum, the cities where public sector employees 
secured collective bargaining have progressed along a markedly different path than the cities 
whose employees never pursued or won bargaining rights. Municipal police and fire 
departments with collective bargaining spend significantly more on their employees’ salaries 
than similar departments without collective bargaining. In police departments, that salary 
premium has come with slightly lower per capita employment levels. But most important, we 
find that the biggest gap between bargaining and nonbargaining cities is in the area of health 
benefits expenditures. When it comes to health benefits for police- and fire-protection 
employees, cities with collective bargaining are spending 15 to 25% more than cities without 
collective bargaining.”). 
 48. See FRANK MANZO ET AL., UNIV. ILL. URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, LAB. EDUC. PROGRAM, 
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADOPTING A RIGHT TO WORK LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR ILLINOIS 16 
(2013) (“By and large, as a policy prescription, RTW would generate harmful effects to 
Illinois’ economy, lower its capacity to provide essential public services, and degrade the 
quality and condition of the state’s labor force.”); EISENACH, supra note 31, at 18 (“Economists 
have been studying the economic effects of RTW laws for more than four decades, and while 
it is inherently difficult to isolate the effects of a single policy on economic performance, the 
weight of the evidence strongly and increasingly suggests that RTW laws improve economic 
performance overall. The evidence on recent economic performance in RTW and non-RTW 
states presented in this study provides further support for this finding.”); Walter J. Wessels, 
Economic Effects of Right to Work Laws, 2 J. LAB. RES. 55, 68 (1981) (“The general results 
showed that the effects of RTW laws appear to be insignificant, with no negative effects on 
wages, union membership, or union problems. On the other hand, RTW laws do have a 
significant and positive effect on job satisfaction, particularly for non-union workers.”). 
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inconsistent with either reasonable government expenditures or positive 
compensation. 
In fact, a pair of articles published by The Economist calls into 
question the economic efficacy of public unions in general.49  While the 
effects of unions on state and municipal economies are difficult to isolate, 
there are several economists that see unions as “localized monopolies on 
labor,” which generate “deadweight losses.”50  Moreover, as the number of 
unionized employees rise, the incentive to maintain a high-quality standard 
of work decreases, as there is less competition for well-paid union 
positions.51  Accordingly, if union sizes were to shrink, logic dictates that 
quality and productivity from unionized employees would increase.52 
C. Is Every Decision in the Public Sector Political? 
The failure of major labor disruptions to emerge in states that do not 
permit the payment of agency fees, combined with an imperfect free rider 
claim, led the majority in Janus to constitutional analysis that favors freedom 
of association (or freedom not to associate53 in the case of the Janus 
petitioners) and the right to be free of compelled speech. Abood drew a 
distinction between political speech and expenses associated with collective 
bargaining.54  In the years after Abood, as its detractors mounted a long attack 
on its free riding justification,55 another argument emerged in support of the 
                                               
 49. See How the Decline of Unions Will Change America, THE ECONOMIST (July 19, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/07/19/how-the-decline-of-unions-will
-change-america; Do Unions Increase Productivity?, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2007), 
https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2007/02/22/do-unions-increase-productivity. 
 50. How the Decline of Unions Will Change America, supra note 49. 
 51. Do Unions Increase Productivity?, supra note 49. 
 52. This is not to say that economists are anywhere near agreed on the issue of union 
productivity and effects on state and local economies. Economist Richard Freeman, famous 
for his literature on unions in the United States and in Europe, has often suggested that 
unionization increases overall productivity, which in turn has a positive economic impact. 
Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, Trade Unions and Productivity: Some New Evidence 
on an Old Issue, 473 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 149, 150 (1984). 
 53. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
 54. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (“We do not hold that a 
union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of 
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its 
duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such 
expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not 
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the 
threat of loss of governmental employment.”). 
 55. See Trevor Burrus, Harris v. Quinn and the Extraordinary Privilege of Compulsory 
Unionization, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283 (2015); Andrew Buttaro, Stalemate at the 
Supreme Court: Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, Public Unions, and Free 
Speech, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 341 (2016); Jacob Huebert, Harris v. Quinn: A Win for 
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elimination of agency fees.  The claim is that everything that happens in the 
public sector—irrespective of the actor but including actions and speech by 
public unions—is inherently political.56  If this is true, opponents of Abood 
note, then a distinction between union political activity and any other union 
function is impossible. 
It is certainly true that any wage increase or change in benefits, 
working hours, or other conditions of employment is certain to have financial 
consequences for taxpayers and their elected representatives. Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine any discussion between an employer and a public union that 
has no financial or political ramifications.  The American Federation of 
Teachers (“AFT”) has, for example, taken positions on a variety of issues 
that are a bit distant from the classroom but intensely political.57  Abortion 
rights, for example, seems unlikely to affect the day-to-day work 
environment of most teachers, but is probably of intense interest to at least 
some of the female dominated membership.58 
Ironically, it may be just this kind of political, but not strictly 
workplace focused, activity that generated growing support over four 
decades for the repeal of Abood.  The biggest dissonance between unions and 
their membership appears to be over intractable political questions and not 
                                               
Freedom of Association, 2013-2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195 (2013–2014); Mark S. Pulliam, 
Union Security Clauses in Public Sector Labor Contracts and Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education: A Dissent, 31 LAB. L. J. 539 (1980); Edwin Vieira, Travesty, tragedy and treason: 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and the Supreme Court’s betrayal of the constitution in 
public-sector labor relations, 19 GOV’T UNION REV. 27 (2000). 
 56. See, e.g., Amie Nolan-Needham & Adama K. Wiltshire, Bargaining with the 
Government vs. Lobbying the Government – A Distinction Without Difference, 58 ORANGE 
CTY. LAW. 41 (2016). 
 57. See Statement by AFT President Randi Weingarten on U.S. Policy Separating 
Children from Parents, AM. FED’N TCHRS. (May 30, 2018), https://www.aft.org/press-
release/statement-aft-president-randi-weingarten-us-policy-separating-children; Stand With 
Planned Parenthood, AM. FED’N TCHRS. (2016), https://www.aft.org/resolution/stand-
planned-parenthood. 
 58. A number of these positions are taken up directly on the AFT website. See id. For 
example, under a “resolutions” section of its website, the union states: “WHEREAS, the 
American Federation of Teachers has had a long history of support for reproductive rights and 
for Planned Parenthood; and WHEREAS, attacks by extremist groups and politicians on 
reproductive rights and women’s health and economic well-being are a major part of the 
ongoing war on women in the United States; and WHEREAS, those opposed to safe, legal 
abortions for women have demanded an end to federal funding to Planned Parenthood and 
even threatened a government shutdown to get it. They have made outrageous allegations to 
attack Planned Parenthood. Their goal is to ban all abortions and cut women off from needed 
healthcare.” Stand With Planned Parenthood, supra note 57. AFT president Randy 
Weingarten also recently attacked President Trump’s immigration policy, denouncing the 
separation of children from their families and calling out the Trump administration. Statement 
by AFT President Randi Weingarten on U.S. Policy Separating Children from Parents, supra 
note 57. 
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whether a raise or more vacation time would be desirable.  For example, in 
2016, 51% of union members said they would support Democratic candidates 
in the next election cycle, and 29% said they would support Republican 
candidates, compared to 47% for Democrats and 34% for Republicans in 
2018.59 
II. BARGAINING DISTORTIONS, WAGES, AND POST-EMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS: CASE STUDY SUMMARIES 
A. California Prison Guards 
Although Justice Kagan’s dissent emphasizes the ostensibly positive 
contributions of public unions to the workplace,60 a balanced assessment of 
                                               
 59. Tim Reid & Joseph Ax, Democrats Target Union Workers Who Regret Trump Vote, 
REUTERS ((May 4, 2018, 6:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-unions-
insight/democrats-target-union-workers-who-regret-trump-vote-idUSKBN1I5181. 
 60. Justice Kagan’s dissent was largely concerned with the practical consequences that 
public employees will face in overturning Abood and ruling agency fees unconstitutional. See 
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). She writes: “[The majority’s] decision will have large-scale consequences. Public 
employee unions will lose a secure source of financial support. State and local governments 
that thought fair-share provisions furthered their interests will need to find new ways of 
managing their workforces. Across the country, the relationships of public employees and 
employers will alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected ways.” Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). She further emphasized that both the state and the union have considered the 
agency-fee arrangement as necessary for maintaining an adequate quality of collective 
bargaining, specifically because of the free rider and labor peace rationales that the majority 
deemed inadequate to overcome First Amendment concerns (a more in depth analysis of the 
majority’s reasoning can be found infra, note 24). Id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“First, 
exclusive representation arrangements benefit some government entities because they can 
facilitate stable labor relations. In particular, such arrangements eliminate the potential for 
inter-union conflict and streamline the process of negotiating terms of employment. Second, 
the government may be unable to avail itself of those benefits unless the single union has a 
secure source of funding. The various tasks involved in representing employees cost money; 
if the union doesn’t have enough, it can’t be an effective employee representative and 
bargaining partner. And third, agency fees are often needed to ensure such stable funding. 
That is because without those fees, employees have every incentive to free ride on the union 
dues paid by others.”) (internal citations omitted). Justice Kagan’s concern is grounded in the 
fact that judging by the number of government entities that bargain with unions that act as 
exclusive representatives, eliminating agency fee arrangements subverts the labor relations 
landscape that state and local governments believe are best. Id. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“Without a fair-share agreement, the class of union non-members spirals upward. Employees 
(including those who love the union) realize that they can get the same benefits even if they 
let their memberships expire. And as more and more stop paying dues, those left must take up 
the financial slack (and anyway, begin to feel like suckers)—so they too quit the union. And 
when the vicious cycle finally ends, chances are that the union will lack the resources to 
effectively perform the responsibilities of an exclusive representative—or, in the worst case, 
to perform them at all. The result is to frustrate the interests of every government entity that 
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the post-Janus landscape requires a little focus on some of the egregious 
behavior those same unions have demonstrated.  A little known, but useful, 
example may be found in the California Correction Peace Officers 
Association (“CCPOA”).61  The CCPOA represents prison guards throughout 
California, and its consistent support for harsher penalties and other 
initiatives designed to increase the number of prisoners has, by almost any 
measure, been extraordinarily effective.62 
In 2013, the CCPOA raised on average about twenty-three million 
dollars per year via dues payments from members.63  The union devoted 
resources in support of the state’s “three strikes” law64 and expended funds 
to defeat a proposition designed to reduce sentences for nonviolent crimes.65  
Whether sentences ultimately lead to a reduction in crime and/or recidivism 
is, of course, the subject of some debate.66  What is certain is that the union 
                                               
thinks a strong exclusive-representation scheme will promote stable labor relations.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 61. The CCPOA signed its first contract in 1982 and has since become one of the most 
influential unions in the state. CAL. CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS ASS’N, 
http://www.ccpoa.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). The CCPOA annually gives twice as much 
money to political contributions than does the California Teachers Association despite being 
one-tenth its size. Volokh, supra note 30, at 1221–22. Although many of its contributions are 
difficult to trace explicitly to a political agenda, it has made a number of clearly pro-
incarceration efforts. For example, it gave over $100,000 to the Three Strikes policy, and 
$75,000 to opponents of Proposition 36, which would have substituted incarceration for 
substance abuse programs. Id. at 1222. Further, from 1998 to 2000 it contributed $120,000 to 
crime victims’ groups in order to foster a tough-on-crime atmosphere. Id. Prison guard unions 
in Florida, Michigan, and New York have followed similar trajectories, albeit on a smaller 
scale, by endorsing candidates that are tough on crime and that will enact sentencing policies 
that will keep prisoners in prison for longer periods of time. Id. at 1223. 
 62. Volokh, supra note 30, at 1223. 
 63. Sagar Jethani, Union of the Snake: How California’s Prison Guards Subvert 
Democracy, MIC (May 14, 2013), https://mic.com/articles/41531/union-of-the-snake-how-
california-s-prison-guards-subvert-democracy#.ZE6QPyRKi. 
 64. Volokh, supra note 30, at 1222. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. PRYOR ET AL., U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE PAST PREDICTS 
THE FUTURE: CRIMINAL HISTORY AND RECIDIVISM OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS 14 (2002) 
(“Overall, an offender’s total criminal history score is a strong predictor of recidivism. 
Rearrest rates range from a low of 30.2[%] of offenders with zero criminal history points to a 
high of 85.7[%] for offenders with 15 or more criminal history points. Each additional criminal 
history point is generally associated with a greater likelihood of recidivism.”); Anne Larason 
Schneider, Recidivism Rate of Juvenile Offenders, 1 JUST. Q. 107, 123 (1984) (“If the reform 
system strengthened the confidence of law enforcement officers, consequently increasing the 
contact and referral rates while simultaneously decreasing “true” recidivism, the net effect 
would be one of “no change” in recidivism, similar to what was observed here.”); Symposium, 
Accomplishing the Purposes of Sentencing—Criminal History and Recidivism, 15 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 185 (2003) (“The preliminary data show that the percentage of recidivating 
offenders correlates generally with the criminal history score: the higher the criminal history 
score, the higher the rate of recidivism. In addition, the early results suggest that the lowest 
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spends in order to directly influence state public policy in a way that increases 
the demand for the work its members do.67 
According to Sagar Jethani, an economy and business analyst,68 
prison guards in California are the “number one” source of cell phone 
smuggling for prisoners.69  When the prison administration attempted to 
initiate a requirement that guards go through metal detectors and remove 
shoes, belts, etc., the union responded by citing a work requirement that 
requires guards be paid for so called “walk time” which would include time 
going through the detectors.70  Thus, the cell phone smuggling led directly to 
increased compensation as the state attempted to tamp down on illegal union 
member activity.71  This small, yet depressing, instance of union members’ 
own misbehavior leading directly to increased compensation reflects a view 
of the employment relationship that is fundamentally abusive and indifferent 
to legitimate taxpayer interests. 
                                               
recidivism rates are found among offenders with no prior arrests or convictions. The on-going 
research will evaluate the contribution to recidivism prediction from computational factors 
included in the criminal history score.”); Chad R. Trulson et al., Blended Sentencing, Early 
Release, and Recidivism of Violent Institutionalized Delinquents, 91 PRISON J. 255, 274 (2011) 
(“Blended sentencing in the state under study allowed extremely serious and violent 
delinquents one more chance to change their ways by giving 1,804 of them the benefit of the 
doubt. Fortunately, the overall level of recidivism for this risky group of offenders appears 
lower than that found in the literature for samples of state committed delinquents. 
Unfortunately, the risk was that roughly one half of the recidivists continued to perpetrate 
felony-level crimes post release. While this study cannot definitively answer what would have 
happened with continued adult incarceration of these offenders, blended sentencing was the 
catalyst for their juvenile system release when such offenders were eligible for continued adult 
incarceration.”); Yan Zhang et al., Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing Models: A 
State-Specific Analysis of their Effects on Recidivism, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 693, 711 (2009) 
(“In sum, our analyses suggest that the effects of different sentencing models on reoffending 
may be largely contingent on the implementation and operation of state programs. Differences 
observed may be attributable to various supervision approaches within the states, differing 
expertise of state parole boards, or differing crime categories that are legislatively mandated. 
Because each state has very different approaches to parole, when parole may occur, and for 
what crimes offenders are eligible for parole, different classes of criminals have different 
propensities for recidivism.”). 
 67. See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1222. 
 68. Jethani, supra note 63. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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California’s prison system is marked by high recidivism rates,72 the 
steady dismantling of rehabilitation programs, and overcrowding.73  The 
courts have intervened routinely and found that “medical, mental health, 
dental care, juvenile incarceration practices, treatment of physically and 
developmentally disabled inmates and due process for parolees have all been 
found to be unconstitutional.”74  While some of the blame surely belongs to 
the administrators, the CCPOA plays a crucial role. 
It is critical to understand that as the prison population in California 
is huge, so is the CCPOA.  Indeed, the California Department of Corrections 
is the single largest employer in the state.75  In 2009 the budget for adult 
corrections was about $9.5 billion, or 9% of the state’s budget.76  Between 
1984 and 2006, though, expenditures for corrections increased by 1094%, 
even as overall state expenditures rose by only 294%.77  Salary increases for 
corrections officers account for a substantial portion of these costs.78 
The CCPOA has “emerged as one of the state’s most powerful 
unions and has used its lobbying and political activities to influence elections 
and legislation.”79  A good comparison with respect to political activity is 
this: In spite of having only one-tenth of the membership of the California 
                                               
 72. California’s recidivism rate is roughly 65%, according to data collected by the 
California Innocence Project. Recidivism Rates, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/recidivism-rates/ (last visited Nov. 15, 
2018). Notably, the three states most comparable in population to California (Texas, New 
York, and Florida) have recidivism rates of 21.4%, 42%, and 33%, respectively. Letter from 
Policy Analyst Douglas Smith to Texas Senate Committee on Criminal Justice (May 2016) 
(on file with Texas Criminal Justice Coalition); Samantha House, New York DOCCS: 
Recidivism Rates for Ex-Inmates Hits 28-Year Low, CITIZEN (Nov. 28, 2014), 
https://auburnpub.com/news/local/new-york-doccs-recidivism-rates-for-ex-inmates-hit-
/article_c765fdb9-3bcd-59c0-9c11-6cfe217fcd62.html; Help Reduce the Recidivism Rates in 
Florida, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/ken-detzner-help-reduce-the-recidivism-
rates-in-florida (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 73. See California’s Continuing Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/opinion/sunday/californias-continuing-prison-
crisis.html (“California’s prison population is consistently among the largest in the country. 
While it presents an extreme case, its problems are representative of what is happening in 
prisons and jails in other states. If California would redirect its energy from battling the federal 
courts to making the needed long-term reforms, it could once again call itself a leader.”). 
 74. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (finding that overcrowding in California 
prisons was so severe as to constitute an Eight Amendment violation for affected prisoners). 
 75. Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 
CRIME & JUST. 207, 224 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 222. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Seventy percent of the corrections budget goes towards spending on staff salaries 
and benefits. Id. at 224. By 2006, the average correctional officer in California earned $73,248, 
over $13,000 more than the average assistant professor with a PhD at the University of 
California. Id. at 225. 
 79. Id. at 224 
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Teachers Association (“CTA”), CCPOA makes annual political 
contributions at twice the rate of the CTA.80 
B. The Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority Pension Debacle 
While there are many examples of public employee retirement 
systems that are underfunded and/or poorly managed,81 the Massachusetts 
Bay Transit Authority’s (“MBTA”) pension gap stands out.  Since 2010, the 
MBTA has had more retirees drawing pensions than active workers 
contributing to the fund.82  As recently as 2007, the MBTA plan was 92% 
funded, which was excellent.83  Since then, the fund has deteriorated badly.  
Estimates for 2016 showed that the MBTA fund would drop below 50% 
funded by 2021 without an emergency infusion of cash.84  How did this crisis 
develop in such a short period of time? 
At least part of the problem stems from the contract between the 
MBTA and its employees’ exclusive representative—the Boston Carmen’s 
Union.  Although the Carmen’s Union has suggested that the MBTA is 
exaggerating in order to cut retirement benefits,85 the evidence is 
overwhelming that the shortfall is real and a result of several factors 
including poor management and exceptionally generous early retirement 
options. 
MBTA Chief Administrator Brian Shortsleeve noted that the 
structure of the MBTA plan may need to change in order for it to remain 
solvent.86  He noted, “[T]he plan provides an incentive for [MBTA] 
employees to retire younger, and half of MBTA employees retire and begin 
to draw on their pension while in their 50s.”87  He also noted that MBTA 
retirees “earn significantly more in post-retirement pension benefits than 
state employees and teachers at all ages.”88 
                                               
 80. Volokh, supra, note 30, at 1221–22. 
 81. See Beermann, supra note 17; FITZPATRICK & MONAHAN, supra note 17; Novy-
Marx & Rauh, Revenue Demands, supra note 17; Novy-Marx & Rauh, Liabilities and Risks, 
supra note 17; RAUH, supra note 17. 
 82. Colin A. Young, Ballooning MBTA Pension Gap Forces Officials to Weigh Options, 
BOS. BUS. J. (May 22, 2017, 7:20 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2017/05/2
2/ballooning-mbta-pension-gap-forces-officials-to.html. 
 83. Beth Healy, MBTA Pension Fund Needs $1 Billion, Report Says, BOS. GLOBE (May 
22, 2017),https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/21/mbtapension/bUtQQmpyps6s
ADWqBPOKPL/story.html. 
 84. Young, supra note 82. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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The numbers and role of the Carmen’s Union are both critical here. 
The fund, which reported about $1.5 billion in assets in 2017, has 5,786 bus 
drivers, track workers, and other employees.89  It supports 6,685 retirees.90  
In addition, the MBTA’s head of the retirement fund, Michael Mulhern, took 
home $2.2 million in compensation in the eight years following the great 
recession, including a salary of $216,329 in 2016 during which he worked 
for only seven months.91  This compensation included pay for unused 
vacation time of about $50,000.92  Mr. Mulhern stepped down as the fund’s 
executive director “after a tumultuous period during which the retirement 
board came under fire for its lack of transparency and for controversial 
accounting practices.”93 
The MBTA’s retirement fund problems are unquestionably the result 
of poor management and unorthodox practices that seem to be implicitly 
premised on the expectation that, one day, the legislature will bail the 
underfunded plan out. MBTA employees “contribute less toward their 
pension, retire earlier[,] and receive richer benefits” in spite of union claims 
to the contrary.94  Union officials have consistently overestimated the fund’s 
performance:  Officials estimated 4% returns for ten years and then 7% 
thereafter, when in reality it has been 3.9% and then 5.8% for the past 
decade.95 
Greg Sullivan of the Pioneer Institute has focused on the MBTA’s 
pension woes for some time, and his work suggests that, contrary to the 
Carmen’s Union narrative, the MBTA is not underfunded relative to other 
transportation systems around the country.96  On the contrary, “as measured 
by both passenger miles traveled and vehicle revenue hours, the [MBTA] 
received the most capital funding of any of the nation’s [ten] largest transit 
systems between 1991 and 2013.”97  From 1991 to 2013, the MBTA actually 
ranks first in total capital spending, which includes federal funding, among 
the top ten.98 
                                               
 89. Healy, supra note 83. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Beth Healy, Former MBTA Pension Chief Earned $2.2 Million Since 2009, BOS. 
GLOBE (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/02/21/mbta-pension-
chief-earned-million-since/zKG61M8EuraKL7pQqw4WJI/story.html?event=event12. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Greg Sullivan & Charles Chieppo, Commentary, MBTA Pension: A Ticking Time 
Bomb, WGBH NEWS (July 5, 2017), https://www.wgbh.org/news/2017/07/05/local-
news/mbta-pensions-ticking-time-bomb. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Greg Sullivan, The Myth of the Underfunded MBTA, PIONEER INST. (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://pioneerinstitute.org/better_government/the-myth-of-the-underfunded-mbta/. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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In addition to first place in state and local operating funds99 and total 
operating funds,100 the MBTA has resulted in “Massachusetts residents . . . 
pay[ing] more than twice as much per capita as the average for residents 
served by the MBTA’s five peer transit systems when both capital and 
operating funds are considered.”101  General mismanagement and growing 
pension costs appear to account for most of the cost distortions.102 
The Carmen’s Union and other unions that do business with the 
MBTA have consistently opposed calls to revamp or privatize the MBTA’s 
operations.103  The ongoing financial woes of the MBTA can only be 
understood as the fallout from a dynamic between the Carmen’s Union and 
the state that prioritized unusually generous benefits for early retirement (and 
concomitant long payout periods).  The present bleak picture is a direct 
function of the MBTA board’s morally hazardous, kick-the-problem-down-
the-road view of its role as employer.  This failure to negotiate at arms’ length 
with the Union will now force taxpayers and communities to absorb large 
cost increases in order to provide ongoing service. 
C. Central Falls Rhode Island and Bankruptcy Fall Out 
The painful, albeit not entirely unexpected, municipal bankruptcy in 
the small city of Central Falls, Rhode Island, has been the subject of several 
studies104 that likewise highlight the disastrous connection between 
                                               
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Gregory W. Sullivan, The MBTA’s Problem is Not Lack of Funding, PIONEER INST. 
8 (Mar. 25, 2015), http://pioneerinstitute.org/download/mbtas-problem-is-not-lack-of-fundin
g/. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Christian M. Wade, MBTA union blasts Baker’s plan for privatization, EAGLE-
TRIBUNE (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.eagletribune.com/news/haverhill/mbta-union-blasts-
baker-s-plan-for-privatization/article_2ca6a3a7-f151-5f41-9919-61bd531abe1f.html 
(quoting Carmen’s Union President James O’Brien as saying that privatization of the MBTA 
“isn’t good for the hardworking employees of the MBTA, and it isn’t good for the system, and 
it certainly isn’t good for our riders.”); Antonio Caban, At rally, union workers resist MBTA 
privatization, NEW BOS. POST (Sept. 23, 2015, 1:17 PM), https://newbostonpost.com/2015/0
9/23/ at-rally-union-workers-resist-mbta-privatization/; MBTA Workers Speak Out Against 
Plans To Privatize Services, WBUR NEWS (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/
02/10/mbta-privatization-plan. 
 104. See Jack M. Beermann, Resolving the Public Pension “Crisis”, 41 FORDHAM URB. 
L. J. 999 (2014); Beermann, supra note 17; David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675 (2015); Mary Williams Walsh & Abby 
Goodnough, A Small City’s Depleted Pension Fund Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES (July 
11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcy-
over-pension-promises.html; Mary Williams Walsh, Cuts for the Already Retired, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/pension-deal-in-rhode-
island-could-set-a-trend.html; Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18. 
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compliant elected officials that over-commit, often over many decades, to 
very generous benefits in the process of bargaining with their public unions. 
Central Falls filed for bankruptcy in 2011—the second U.S. city to 
do so105—following the depletion of its pension fund.  The bankruptcy 
resulted in the closure of the city’s only public library and community center, 
a reduction in the city’s workforce of almost one-third and triggered a sharp 
increase in property taxes in spite of an average annual household income of 
only about $34,000.106 
Robert Flanders, Central Falls’ receiver during the bankruptcy 
process, noted that the crisis was a result of pensions promised by city 
officials that were overly generous, collective bargaining agreements which 
permitted employees to retire after only twenty years irrespective of age, and 
rules that allowed retirees to obtain other jobs that also accrued benefits while 
drawing a pension.107 
Municipal bankruptcy essentially pits the claims of bondholders 
against those of retirees as both groups scramble to get the city to honor 
promises made to them.  As Amy Monahan and others108 have noted, 
“[m]illions of teachers, police officers, firefighters and other government 
workers have long believed that their pensions were untouchable, thanks to 
provisions in state laws and constitutions.  But some of those promises are 
unclear or untested.”109 
In the case of Central Falls, bondholders prevailed, and significant 
cuts were made to many retirees.110  Taxpayers were also forced to absorb 
4% increases in property taxes.111  Specifically, workers who retired at a 
                                               
 105. Prichard, Alabama, has the honor of being first. See Douglas J. Watson et al., 
Financial Distress and Municipal Bankruptcy: The Case of Prichard, Alabama, 17 J. PUB. 
BUDGETING ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 129 (2005); Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public 
Pensions: The Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89 
(2011); Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Alabama Town’s Failed Pension Is a 
Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/business/23pri
chard.html. 
 106. Walsh & Goodnough, supra note 104. 
 107. Richard Simon, Rhode Island’s Central Falls Reeling From Underfunded Pension, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 03, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/03/nation/la-na-adv-central-
falls-20130804. 
 108. See Skeel, supra note 104; Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The 
“California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029 (2012); 
Walsh, supra note 104. 
 109. Mary Williams Walsh & Michael Cooper, Faltering Rhode Island City Tests Vows 
to Pensioners, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 13, 2011),https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13bankr
uptcy.html. 
 110. Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18, at 526 (“Current retirees’ pension payments 
were reduced by approximately 55% and cost of living adjustments (COLAs) were 
eliminated.”). 
 111. Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-
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young age saw their pension benefit cut by 55% and cost of living 
adjustments were eliminated.112  Those whose pensions were worth $10,000 
per year or less were unaffected.113  Employees who survived the job cuts 
had to contribute more to their pension and work longer before they could 
retire.114 
The Central Falls story, while painful, was not especially surprising 
to anyone who had been paying attention to the city’s finances.  The promises 
city officials made to police, firefighters, and other municipal workers were 
simply more generous than the city could afford.  Well-organized public 
unions demanded these long-term financial expenditures, and elected 
officials complied.  Basically, both the unions and the politicians decided it 
was mutually beneficial to borrow from future taxpayers in order to satisfy 
present day wants.  Wealthier cities may be able to play this game for some 
time; moderate income and poor locales cannot overspend for very long.  
And, when the bondholders are first in line, as maybe they should be,115 the 
overpromising ends with painful adjustments and to some who are least able 
to absorb them: the elderly and others whose return to the labor market is 
likely difficult or impossible. 
D. Political and Financial Distortions 
The purpose of providing these three short case studies is to 
demonstrate some of the consequences of concentrated union power in the 
public sector.  To the extent that some observers are disappointed by Janus 
and worry that it is little more than an attempt to strip public unions of the 
funds they have been supplying to Democratic and left leaning political 
causes,116 the behavior of the CCPOA should provoke a careful re-think.  An 
analysis of the behavior of police unions, especially with respect to the use 
of deadly force and the punishment of officers, suggests that a similar 
                                               
from-bankruptcy.html (“The plan imposes a 4 percent property tax increase in each of the next 
five years while the number of city employees has fallen.”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18, at 526. 
 115. Skeel, supra note 104, at 687; see generally Walsh & Goodnough, supra note 104. 
 116. See Vince Courtney, U.S. Supreme Court’s Janus Decision: Pure Unadulterated 
Politics, BAY CITY BEACON (July 23, 2018), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/u-s-
supreme-court-s-janus-decision-pure-unadulterated-politics/article_6dd04560-8ead-11e8-
9fab-2f3665e90ff6.html; Sean McElwee, How the Right’s War on Unions is Killing the 
Democratic Party, NATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/right-to-work-
laws-are-killing-democrats-at-the-ballot-box/. See also Millhiser, supra, note 25; Schoen 
supra, note 25. 
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dynamic is at work.117  Aside from the policy stances, the MBTA and Central 
Falls examples bring into sharp relief the financial consequences for 
taxpayers once the years of profligate spending and mismanagement come to 
light and it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that the long run has, at 
last, arrived. 
To the extent that Janus results in a decline in public sector union 
political activity, policy discourse and prudent financial decision making 
might well improve.  Without the strong distorting effects of the union’s 
financially self-interested voice, it might be possible to focus on initiatives 
that will provide suitable policy results at a reasonable cost. 
Public unions may be forced, as Rob Weil, director of field programs 
for the American Federation of Teachers, noted, “to spend larger amounts of 
time and money on membership maintenance instead of other more 
progressive union activities.”118  Given that there is some evidence that 
teacher-members are less liberal than their union,119 the post-Janus pressure 
to be as responsive to members as possible could result in a moderation of 
some unions’ views toward broad member consensus.  And, with fewer 
dollars to spend, the tendency to support policy initiatives that are focused 
                                               
 117. In a 2017 piece, the New York Times noted that of fifteen of the most high-profile 
wrongful shootings by police officers over the previous three years, only one police officer 
actually faced the possibility of jail time. Jasmine C. Lee & Haeyoun Park, 15 Black Lives 
Ended in Confrontations With Police. 3 Officers Convicted., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/17/us/black-deaths-police.html. As of 
November 10, 2018, there had been 830 people in the United States shot and killed by police 
officers. Fatal Force, WASH. POST https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national
/police-shootings-2018/?utm_term=.3adb83f85f54 (last updated Oct. 1, 2018). Naturally, the 
American people have called for more transparency and accountability for police officers, yet 
police unions have lobbied extensively to stagnate such efforts. See Hector Villagra, Police 
Union Lobbying Stymies Police Reform, L.A. PROGRESSIVE (July 24, 2016), 
https://www.laprogressive.com/police-union-lobbying/ (“So why isn’t public opinion enough 
– why are California politicians doing or attempting to do the exact opposite of what the public 
wants? It’s because the police lobby wields an inordinate amount of power, and too few 
politicians are willing to challenge it. The efforts to make body cam video and investigations 
into police misconduct accessible to the public – and seemingly all major police reforms – 
have been vehemently opposed by police unions and law enforcement organizations, which 
work excessively to promote secrecy and avoid scrutiny and criticism.”). Police unions have 
also been an under-the-radar proponent of laws that make it more difficult to publicly protest 
by enacting deeper economic penalties and even possible jail time for those who engage in 
particularly “disruptive” behavior. See Katherine Krueger, Police Unions are Quietly Trying 
to Make it Harder to Protest All Over America, SPLINTER NEWS (Apr. 17, 2018, 12:15 PM), 
https://splinternews.com/police-unions-are-quietly-trying-to-make-it-harder-to-p-
1825321943. 
 118. Larry Sand, The Political Aftermath of Janus v. AFSCME, CAL. POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 
7, 2017), https://californiapolicycenter.org/political-aftermath-janus-v-afscme/. 
 119. See, e.g., Johnathan Rauch, The Conservative Case for Unions, ATLANTIC (July 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-conservative-case-for-
unions/528708/. 
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only on union job creation might be reduced as well.  With respect to the 
CCPOA and the development of a policy about the incarceration of non-
violent offenders, one can only hope that best practices with respect to 
reducing crime and recidivism will one day predominate over feather-
bedding for guards.120 
III. “LABOR PEACE” AND FREE RIDING 
A. The Foundations of Abood 
The Court in Abood cited the maintenance of “labor peace” and the 
avoidance of free riding in support of its decision permitting the collection of 
agency fees.121  The majority in Janus noted that twenty-eight states and the 
federal government do not permit agency fees.122  And, in the many cases 
                                               
 120. “Featherbedding” is the practice of hiring more employees than are necessary to do 
a job, or implementing an unnecessary policy for the sole purpose of hiring more staff. E.D. 
HIRSCH ET AL., THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 456 (3d ed. 2002). 
Featherbedding is most classically associated with railway workers, whose unions have 
historically negotiated agreements that prohibit certain classes of employees from engaging in 
work designated for a different class of employee, even though the work is similar and could 
easily be accomplished by fewer people than the agreement calls for. See J.A. Lipowski, 
Featherbedding on the Railroads: By Law and by Agreement, 8 TRANSP. L. J. 141, 150 (1976). 
 121. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977). Writing for the majority, 
Justice Stewart states: “The governmental interests advanced by the agency-shop provision in 
the Michigan statute are much the same as those promoted by similar provisions in federal 
labor law. The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers’ unions, holding quite 
different views as to the proper class hours, class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and 
grievance procedures, each sought to obtain the employer’s agreement, are no different in kind 
from the evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid. The 
desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free 
riders’ any smaller.” Id. at 224 (internal citations omitted). In promoting the efficacy of agency 
fees in the public sector, Justice Stewart further notes: “A union-shop arrangement has been 
thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who benefit, and it 
counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’ to 
refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that 
necessarily accrue to all employees.” Id. at 221-22. The majority in Janus takes great care to 
undermine these justifications for agency fees, noting the tenuous link between agency fees 
and the maintenance of labor peace, as well as the implications were free rider arguments 
taken to their logical extensions. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2457 (2018). 
 122. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2457 (“In Abood, the main defense of the state agency-fee 
arrangement was that it served the State’s interest in ‘labor peace.’ By ‘labor peace,’ the Abood 
Court meant avoidance of the conflict and disruption that it envisioned would occur if the 
employees in a unit were represented by more than one union. In such a situation, the Court 
predicated, ‘inter-union rivalries’ would foster ‘dissension within the workforce,’ and the 
employer could face ‘conflicting demands from different unions.’ . . . [I]t is now clear that 
Abood’s fears were unfounded. The Abood Court assumed that designation of a union as the 
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where a union remains the exclusive representative of the employees, the 
chaos and dissension the Abood Court so feared never materialized.123 
The “free riding” argument is the more interesting of the two claims 
and was promoted by AFSCME and its supporters in many of the briefs filed 
in the case.124  The gist of this claim is that no employee should enjoy the 
benefit of union representation without bearing some of the costs. Justice 
Kagan explicitly noted that agency fees “prevent[] employees from reaping 
all the ‘benefits of union representation’—higher pay, a better retirement 
plan, and so forth—while leaving it to others to bear the costs.”125 
                                               
exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency fees are 
inextricably linked, but that is simply not true.” Id. at 2465 (internal citations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 2466. 
 124. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13–14, Janus v. 
AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) (“The free rider problem is not merely that 
nonmembers will benefit from the union’s services without bearing their fair share of the cost, 
but that this cost-shifting would be compelled by law. This makes it materially different from 
the more general issue of free riders in the private sphere. . . . That free ridership, more 
critically, would directly undermine the associational interests of union members. Under 
Petitioner’s rule, even employees who favor the union’s positions or any benefits it conveys 
will have every incentive to shift the costs of their representation to members - as they will be 
able reap the same benefits without spending a dime. As the Internet has repeatedly shown, 
individuals who get something for free cannot be counted on to voluntarily pay for it. A 
decision rejecting agency fees would thus deal a severe blow to the interests of those who 
choose to associate with unions. Abood’s compromise, by contrast, respects both members’ 
and nonmembers’ associational interests.”); Brief for Labor Law & Labor Relations 
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21–22, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) (“Employee free riding undermines states’ interests in equitable 
workforce policies and risks sowing dissent in the workplace. Moreover, to the extent states 
adopt public sector collective bargaining statutes because they prefer that method of setting 
pay rates and other working conditions, that interest is also undermined: research shows that 
right-to-work laws make it less likely that public sector bargaining units will form.”) (internal 
citations omitted); Brief for Economists and Professors of Law and Economics as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-
1466) (“In sum, it is well established that free riding follows from individual economic self-
interest in the context of collective goods, even when everyone agrees that they benefit from 
those goods. If individuals are not required to contribute, many who undisputedly benefit will 
nevertheless withhold their contributions out of simple self-interest, and others will withhold 
their contributions to avoid being taken advantage of by the free riders. A committed core may 
be able to sustain itself and provide some amount of the collective good, but even if some 
contributors persevere, the amount of the collective good will be sub-optimal, and will tend to 
decrease further and further below the optimum as the contagion of free riding spreads, 
resulting in increasing exploitation of the dwindling contributors.”); Brief for Respondent at 
35, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) (“Free-riding is 
indeed precisely what economic theory predicts when members of a bargaining unit may 
choose independently whether to vote for and whether to pay for a bargaining agent. Even if 
a non-member believes she benefits from the union’s representation, she may vote for the 
union as representative (and reap the benefits of bargaining representation and assistance in 
grievance proceedings) yet opt not to join the union to avoid paying dues.”). 
 125. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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As Professor Moorhouse has noted, analysis of the free rider doctrine 
first requires attention to the theory of public goods.126  The central idea 
behind the free rider claim is that union benefits are comparable to public 
goods and that the agency fee is an appropriate response to a market failure 
exhibited by free riders—i.e., those who enjoy benefits while declining to 
contribute to their cost.127  Public goods can be distinguished from private 
goods by their non-excludability and joint consumption.128  Non-
excludability simply means that the supplier of the good in question cannot 
exclude others from consumption, and joint consumption means “the benefits 
obtained by any single individual in consuming the good in no way reduces 
the consumption benefits available to others. . . .”129  The classic example of 
a public good is national defense, although there are other examples as 
well.130 
Professor Moorhouse argues that, with respect to non-excludability, 
union political activity in the form of political contributions does not meet 
the criteria in spite of superficial similarities to public goods: 
Suppose, for example, union support of a lobbying effort 
leads to a more favorable legal environment within which 
the union operates. Presumably all union members would 
benefit, contributors and non-contributors alike. Several 
observations are in order: (1) in most cases, the thread from 
the individual’s contribution through the union to the 
recipient organization and finally through the benefit 
generating process seems tenuous in terms of concrete 
benefits to an individual; (2) such benefits may not be 
perceived as beneficial by every union member; and (3) any 
externalities arising here have nothing to do with union 
administration of such donations. Many private 
organizations rely on voluntary contributions, which in turn 
are used to influence legislation. Unions are hardly unique 
in this respect. Thus, these externalities do not justify 
mandatory assessments for political causes. . . . Not only is 
exclusion feasible, there is evidence that many union 
members object to union involvement in political activities. 
                                               
 126. John C. Moorhouse, Compulsory Unionism and the Free-Rider Doctrine, 2 CATO J. 
619, 620 (1982). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 620–21. 
 130. Examples of public goods range from language and mathematics, to clean air, the 
internet, and light from lighthouses. See Public Goods: A Brief Introduction, LINUX INFO. 
PROJECT (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.linfo.org/public_good.html. 
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[citation omitted] Such activities can hardly be thought of as 
collective goods to those employees who object to them.131 
The reasons unions do not charge a grievance procedure fee is not 
that the service represents a public good, but because it allows the union to 
discriminate among employees and to discipline those out of favor with the 
union leadership.132 
Moorhouse also notes that non-excludability assumes that the 
benefits of collective bargaining are distributed equitably among union 
members.133  He points out that super seniority and the use of seniority to 
determine job assignments, bumping rights, job security, and access to 
overtime opportunities all suggest the opposite—i.e., that benefits are doled 
out in a highly uneven manner and often depend upon longevity and support 
of union leadership.134 
As for the issue of joint consumption, Moorhouse argues that union 
membership fails to satisfy this criterion as well: 
Worker A’s insurance policy protects himself and his 
beneficiaries; Worker B’s moving into a union retirement 
home means another worker cannot occupy that suite; and 
the attention given Worker C by a nurse in the plant 
infirmary means that her services are not available to other 
workers during that period. The individuals appropriating 
the benefits of these services are readily identifiable and can 
be made to bear the costs of the services.135 
Moorhouse’s arguments about free riding are, ultimately, 
unpersuasive.  It is true that unions do not distribute all benefits equally; 
however, it cannot be denied that wage increases, improvements in health 
care, and workplace safety are shared widely enough to qualify as public 
goods. 
The answer to the free rider problem, as Justice Alito seemed to 
recognize, is not that it is not pertinent, but that constitutional considerations 
simply override it.136  The free rider problem does not evaporate because of 
the failure to satisfy perfectly the non-excludability and joint-consumption 
criteria in every instance.  The core conclusion of Janus is that, in spite of 
the free rider problem, the rights of dissenting employees trump the issue of 
                                               
 131. Moorhouse, supra note 126, at 623. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 624. 
 134. Id. at 624–25. 
 135. Id. at 625. 
 136. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2469 (2018). 
2019] COMMON-SENSE DEFENSE OF JANUS 71 
 
how to get them to contribute toward the cost of workplace gains they will 
almost certainly enjoy.  An employee who detests her union’s political 
speech, but likes new safety protocols, wage increases, and additional 
personal leave time, now cannot be forced to pay for the perks while 
distancing herself from the union’s political activity.137 
Additionally, Justice Alito’s opinion in Janus flatly states that “free 
rider arguments . . . are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment 
objections.”138  Justice Alito proposes that free rider arguments, taken to their 
logical conclusions, are untenable.139  He rhetorically asks whether it would 
seem fair to charge nonmembers of any organization that seeks government 
support for a specific group of people to cover the costs of benefits received, 
using groups that support veterans or the elderly as an example.140  However, 
he also acknowledges the argument that public sector unions are statutorily 
required to bargain on behalf of nonmembers, which puts them in a unique 
position.141  Justice Alito deals with this argument by noting that there are 
two reasons the payment of agency fees might amount to a compelling state 
interest in the context of the free rider argument: (1) without agency fees, 
unions might be unwilling to represent nonmembers entirely; and (2) there is 
something fundamentally unfair about an arrangement in which nonmembers 
get to reap the benefits of collective bargaining without contributing.142 
To the first point, Justice Alito notes that unions continue to 
represent nonmembers in the twenty-eight states that do not allow agency 
fees.  That is because exclusive representation confers a number of benefits 
to a public union such that even if nonmembers could “free ride,” unions 
would continue to seek the designation.143  For example, exclusive 
representation not only forces the government employer to bargain in good 
faith, but allows unions special access to employee information and allows 
them to deduct dues directly from wages.  “Representation of nonmembers 
                                               
 137. Id. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority again fails to reckon with how 
economically rational actors behave—in public as well as private workplaces. Without a fair-
share agreement, the class of union non-members spirals upward. Employees (including those 
who love the union) realize that they can get the same benefits even if they let their 
memberships expire. And as more and more stop paying dues, those left must take up the 
financial slack (and anyway, begin to feel like suckers)—so they too quit the union. And when 
the vicious cycle finally ends, chances are that the union will lack the resources to effectively 
perform the responsibilities of an exclusive representative—or, in the worst case, to perform 
them at all. The result is to frustrate the interests of every government entity that thinks a 
strong exclusive-representation scheme will promote stable labor relations.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 138. Id. at 2466 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2467. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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furthers the union’s interest in keeping control of the administration of the 
collective bargaining agreement, since the resolution of one employee’s 
grievance can affect others.”144 
In other words, this is free riding; Janus simply privileges employee 
free speech over the pragmatic, budgetary concerns of public sector unions. 
B. A Word About Labor Peace 
As noted, more than half of the states and the federal government 
operate without agency fees.145  This has not destroyed public unions, but it 
appears to have left them substantially less powerful than their counterparts 
in places like Massachusetts,146 California,147 and Illinois.148  The number of 
strikes, for example, is not higher in states that forbid agency fees than in 
those that permitted them.149  I have not been able to locate any data that 
suggests workplaces in these twenty-eight states or the federal government 
are more chaotic or prone to major disruptions than comparable workplaces 
in the rest of the country.150 
                                               
 140. Id. at 2468. To the second point, Justice Alito notes: “Nor can such fees be justified 
on the ground that it would otherwise be unfair to require a union to bear the duty of fair 
representation. That duty is a necessary concomitant of the authority that a union seeks when 
it chooses to serve as the exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit. As explained, 
designating a union as the exclusive representative of nonmembers substantially restricts the 
nonmembers’ rights. Protection of their interests is placed in the hands of the union, and if the 
union were free to disregard or even work against those interests, these employees would be 
wholly unprotected. That is why we said many years ago that serious ‘constitutional questions 
[would] arise’ if the union were not subject to the duty to represent all employees fairly.” Id. 
at 2469 (internal citations omitted). As such, the statutory requirement of a union to represent 
the interests of nonmembers is not sufficient to raise the free rider concern to the level of a 
compelling state interest. Id. 
 145. Id. at 2466. 
 146. As of 2017, 12.4% of public workers in Massachusetts were members of a union, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Table 5. Union affiliation of employed wage and 
salary workers by state, BUREAU LAB. STATS., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.
htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 147. As of 2017, 15.5% of public workers in California were members of a union, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id. 
 148. As of 2017, 15.0% of public workers in Illinois were members of a union, according 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id. 
 149. Indeed, of the seven biggest strikes of 2017, all seven occurred in states that 
permitted agency fees prior to Janus, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Major Work 
Stoppages in 2017, BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Feb. 9, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/ne
ws.release/pdf/wkstp.pdf. 
 150. Not one amicus brief filed in support of AFSCME pointed to data that establishes a 
connection between right-to-work laws and a disruption of labor peace. See, e.g., Brief for 
American Civil Liberties Union Supporting Respondents, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018) (No. 16-1466) (noting that the Abood Court recognized labor peace as a compelling 
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Wisconsin, after Act 10,151 has seen significant drops in union 
membership (down from about 47% to 19% in the public sector since 
2011152) and comparable drops in union political expenditures.153 
The Wisconsin numbers suggest that at least some states can expect 
a comparable response after Janus.154  How unions will manage the free rider 
problem—if indeed it can be managed—remains to be seen. Massachusetts 
is contemplating changes that would permit unions to deviate from the 
traditional requirements of exclusive representation, although it is too early 
to tell whether this will become law.155 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In spite of the media attention it generated, Janus is essentially 
irrelevant in more than half of the states in the U.S.  Those places in which 
public sector unions have played a large role since Abood are likely to see 
losses in union membership, a reduced role for public unions in the political 
                                               
state interest, but failing to link the collection of agency fees to the maintenance of labor 
peace). 
 151. Act 10, or the Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, essentially prohibits unions from 
bargaining over pensions, health coverage, employee safety, hours, sick leave or vacation 
time. Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/business/wisconsins-legacy-for-unions.html. Base pay 
can be negotiated but cannot exceed a cap set by the Consumer Price Index. Id. Public 
employees have been required to contribute 6% of their salary towards their pension, and 12% 
of their salary towards health care plan costs. Id. For a number of employees, this constituted 
a 12% pay cut. Id. The Act also eliminated Wisconsin’s agency fee arrangement, largely 
incentivizing public workers to either stop paying dues, or simply not join a union with fewer 
resources and far more limited collective bargaining options. Id. While union membership has 
indeed dropped, there are a number of examples in which public sector services have seen 
benefits. Id. For example, the Mequon-Thiensville School District saved $560,000 after 
freezing teacher salaries for two years, and an additional $400,000 by raising employee 
contributions for health care. Id. Similarly, the school district in West Bend, a city north of 
Milwaukee, was forced to cut class sizes and course offerings prior to Act 10, whereas now 
the school district has been able to raise the retirement age for teachers and restructure the 
health plan, saving $250,000 per year. Id. 
 152. Lubenow, supra note 29. 
 153. Between 2000 and 2013, the Wisconsin Education Association Council, the state’s 
largest teachers’ union, spent nearly $13 million on political expenditures. See Hijacking 
Campaign 2016 – Information on WEAC PAC, WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (June 2, 2017), 
http://www.wisdc.org/ind16-500189.php. However, the union reported no independent 
spending in 2014 and spent less than $300 supporting democratic candidates in 2016. Id. 
 154. See Maria Hylton, A Few Observations About the Curious State of Massachusetts 
Labor Law: Public Sector Unions After Janus, U. CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 155. Id. at 3 (under a proposed bill to the Massachusetts Legislature, “[U]nions will no 
longer be obliged to represent fairly all employees in the workplace although their enhanced 
access to all employees’ home addresses, emails, and other contact information should allow 
them ample opportunity to make the case for dues’ paying membership.”). 
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process, and a renewed emphasis on better aligning members’ views with 
those of the union leadership.  Elected officials in states like California, New 
York, Massachusetts, and Illinois may find that reduced financial support 
from public unions is offset by increased freedom to evaluate expenditures 
in a more rational manner akin to the approach of private sector employers. 
I remain cautiously optimistic, although Massachusetts’ initial 
reaction to Janus has been disappointing, as I have described elsewhere,156 
and in California, the governor recently signed a bill that protects public 
unions from lawsuits demanding return of agency fees that were collected 
prior to Janus.157  For those worried about the loss of “labor peace,” the data 
strongly suggest that this was never a legitimate concern.  Those who abhor 
free riding have more reason to be concerned as it appears that the 
requirement to represent all employees—even those that do not want 
representation and, now, do not have to pay for it—will result in some public 
unions’ members bearing the costs for all.  One possible outcome of this free 
riding may be that public unions will have to find a way to attract (not 
compel) more dollars by engaging in activity that members and would-be 
members will support voluntarily.  This should mean that the political 
positions adopted by the leadership will more closely align with those of the 
members. It is hard to see how that is anything but a positive development. 
If the lessons of Central Falls, Rhode Island, and the California 
prison guards teach us anything, it is that incentives always matter.  
Unchecked spending by near-poor municipalities is just a catastrophe in 
waiting—once the long run arrives and the elected officials and union leaders 
who knew that the cost increases were unsustainable have long since retired 
or moved on to higher office, the taxpayers and their dependents will have to 
figure out how to live with reduced services and larger tax bills. 
Similarly, the California prison guards have acted with ruthless self-
interest: more draconian penalties such as “three strikes”-type laws increase 
incarceration rates and thus the demand for the work the guards perform.  It 
makes no real difference whether or not the public is actually safer, and the 
public, relying on the presumably superior knowledge of law enforcement 
and legislators, is not well positioned to investigate these matters in any 
event. 
Public sector unions should probably be banned altogether as 
antithetical to the proper functioning of state and local governments.  In the 
                                               
 156. Maria O’Brien Hylton, A Few Observations About the Curious State of MA Labor 
Law: Public Sector Unions After Janus, 22 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. POL. J. (forthcoming 2019). 
 157. Adam Ashton, State Workers Looking To Recover ‘Fair Share’ Fees Must 
Overcome New California Law, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.sacbee.co
m/news/politics-government/the-state-worker/article218615695.html. 
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meantime, the elimination of a compelled subsidy to entities whose role is so 
problematic is a good first step. 
 
